Introduction
In this survey we examine the empirical properties of the payo!s to two currency speculation strategies: the carry trade and momentum. We then assess the plausibility of the theories proposed in the literature to explain the profitability of these strategies.
The carry trade consists of borrowing low-interest-rate currencies and lending highinterest-rate currencies. The momentum strategy consists of going long (short) on currencies for which long positions have yielded positive (negative) returns in the recent past.
The carry trade, one of the oldest and most popular currency speculation strategies, is motivated by the failure of uncovered interest parity (UIP) documented by Bilson (1981) and Fama (1984) . 1 This strategy has received a great deal of attention in the academic literature as researchers struggle to explain its apparent profitability. Papers that study this strategy include Lustig & Verdelhan (2007) , Brunnermeier et al. (2009) , Jordà & Taylor (2009) , Farhi et al. (2009) , Lustig et al. (2009) , Ra!erty (2010) , Burnside et al. (2011) , and Menkho! et al. (2011a) .
In related work, a number of authors have studied the properties of currency momentum strategies. These authors include Okunev and White (2003) , Lustig et al. (2009) , Menkho! et al. (2011a Menkho! et al. ( , 2011b , Moskowitz et al. (2010) , Ra!erty (2010) , and Asness et al. (2009) .
We begin by addressing the question: is the profitability of the carry trade and momentum strategies just compensation for risk, at least as conventionally measured? After reviewing the empirical evidence we conclude that the answer is no. This conclusion rests on the fact that the covariance between the payo!s to these two strategies and conventional risk factors is not statistically significant.
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The di"culty in explaining the profitability of the carry trade with conventional risk factors has led researchers such as Lustig et al. (2009) and Menkho! et al. (2011a) to 1 See Hodrick (1987) and Engel (1996) for surveys of the literature on uncovered interest parity. 2 This finding is consistent with work documenting that one can reject consumption-based asset pricing models using data on forward exchange rates. See, e.g. Bekaert and Hodrick (1992) and Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (2001) ).
construct empirical risk factors specifically designed to price the average payo!s to portfolios of carry trade strategies. One natural question is whether these risk factors explain the profitability of the momentum strategy. We find that they do not.
An alternative explanation for the profitability of our two strategies is that it reflects the presence of rare disasters or peso problem explanations. We argue, on empirical grounds, that the 2008 financial crisis cannot be used as an example of the kind of rare disaster that rationalizes the profitability of currency trading. The reason is simple: momentum made money during the financial crisis.
We then consider the literature that uses currency options data to characterize the nature of the peso event that rationalizes the profitability of carry and momentum. Based on this analysis we argue that the peso event features moderate losses but a high value of the stochastic discount factor (SDF).
Finally, we explore an alternative explanation for the profitability of the carry trade and momentum strategies. This alternative relies on the existence of price pressure in foreign exchange markets. By price pressure we mean that the price at which investors can buy or sell currencies depends on the quantity they wish to transact. Price pressure introduces a wedge between marginal and average payo!s to a trading strategy. As a result, observed average payo!s can be positive even though the marginal trade is not profitable. So, traders do not increase their exposure to the strategy to the point where observed average risk-adjusted payo!s are zero.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the empirical properties of the payo!s to the two currency strategies that we consider. In Section 3 we discuss riskbased explanations for the profitability of these strategies. Section 4 discusses the impact on inference that results from rare disasters or peso problems. Section 5 provides a brief discussion of the implications of price pressure. A final section concludes.
Currency strategies
In this section we describe the carry trade and currency momentum strategies.
The carry trade strategy This strategy consists of borrowing low-interest-rate currencies and lending high-interest-rate currencies. Assume that the domestic currency is the U.S. dollar (USD) and denote the USD risk-free rate by i t . Let the interest rate on risk-free foreign denominated securities be i ! t . Abstracting from transactions costs, the payo! to taking a long position on foreign currency is:
Here S t denotes the spot exchange rate expressed as USD per foreign currency unit (FCU).
The payo! to the carry trade strategy is:
An alternative way to implement the carry trade is to use forward contracts. We denote by F t the time-t forward exchange rate for contracts that mature at time t + 1, expressed as USD per FCU. A currency is said to be at a forward premium relative to the USD if F t exceeds S t . The carry trade can be implemented by selling forward currencies that are at a forward premium and buying forward currencies that are at a forward discount. The time t payo! to this strategy can be written as:
It is easy to show that, when covered interest parity (CIP) holds, these two ways of implementing the carry trade are equivalent in the sense that z C t+1 and z So, whenever one strategy makes positive profits so does the other.
3 Taking transactions costs into account, deviations from CIP are generally small and rare. See Taylor (1987 Taylor ( , 1989 , Clinton (1988) , and Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleschelski and Rebelo (2006) . However, there were significant deviations from CIP in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. These deviations are likely to have resulted from liquidity issues and counterparty risk. See Mancini-Gri!oli and Ranaldo (2011) for a discussion.
The portfolio carry trade strategy that we consider combines all the individual carry trades in an equally-weighted portfolio. The total value of the bet is normalized to one USD.
We refer to this strategy as the "carry trade portfolio." It is the same as the equally-weighted strategy studied by Burnside et al. (2011) .
The momentum strategy This strategy involves selling (buying) a FCU forward if it was profitable to sell (buy) a FCU forward at time t ! ! . Following Lustig et al. (2009 ), Menkho! et al. (2011a , Moskowitz et al. (2010) , and Ra!erty (2010), we define momentum in terms of the previous month's return, i.e. we choose ! = 1. The excess return to the momentum strategy is:
We consider momentum trades conducted one currency at a time against the U.S. dollar.
We also consider a portfolio momentum strategy that combines all the individual momentum trades in an equally-weighted portfolio with the total value of the bet being normalized to one USD. We refer to this strategy as the "momentum portfolio." 4 2.1 The payo!s to carry and momentum Table 1 provides summary statistics for the payo!s to our two currency strategies implemented for 20 major currencies, over the sample period 1976-2010. 5 In every case, the size of the bet is normalized to one USD.
The carry trade strategy Consider, first, the equally-weighted carry trade strategy. This strategy has an average payo! of 4.6 percent, with a standard deviation of 5.1 percent, and a Sharpe ratio of 0.89. In comparison, the average excess return to the U.S. stock market 4 The strategy we consider di!ers from some momentum strategies studied in the literature, which consist of going long (short) on assets that have done relatively well (poorly) in the recent past, even if the return to these assets was negative (positive). See Jegadeesh & Titman (1993 ), Carhart (1997 , and Rouwenhorst (1998) for a discussion of this cross-sectional momentum strategy in equity markets.
5 See Burnside et al. (2011) for a description of our data sources.
over the same period is 6.5 percent, with a standard deviation of 15.7 percent and a Sharpe ratio of 0.41.
Consider, next, the average payo! to the individual carry trades. Averaged across the 20 currencies, this payo! is 4.6 percent with an average standard deviation of 11.3 percent.
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The corresponding Sharpe ratio is 0.42. The Sharpe ratio of the equally-weighted carry trade is more than twice as large. Consistent with Burnside et al. (2007 Burnside et al. ( , 2008 , this di!erence is entirely attributable to the gains of diversifying across currencies, which cuts volatility by more than 50 percent.
The momentum strategy The equally-weighted momentum strategy is also highly profitable, yielding an average payo! of 4.5 percent. These payo!s have a standard deviation of 7.3 percent and a Sharpe ratio of 0.62. Again, there are substantial returns to diversifying across individual momentum strategies. The average payo! of individual momentum strategies across the 20 currencies is equal to 4.9 percent. The corresponding average standard deviation is 11.3 percent and the Sharpe ratio is 0.43. An equally-weighted combination of the two currency strategies, which we call the "50-50 strategy", has an average payo! of 4.5 percent, a standard deviation of 4.6 percent and a Sharpe ratio of 0.98. The high Sharpe ratio of the combined strategy reflects the low correlation between the payo!s to the two strategies. Figure 1 displays the cumulative returns to investing in the carry and momentum portfolios, in the U.S. stock market, and in Treasury bills. Since the currency strategies involve zero net investment we compute the cumulative payo!s as follows. We initially deposit one USD in a bank account that yields the same rate of return as the Treasury bill rate. In the beginning of every period we bet the balance of the bank account on the strategy. At the end of the period, payo!s to the strategy are deposited into the bank account. Figure   1 shows that the cumulative returns to the carry and momentum portfolios are almost as 6 The average payo! across individual carry trades does not (to two digits) coincide with the average payo! to the equally-weighted portfolio because not all currencies are available for the full sample. 
Mechanical explanations for why these strategies work
In this section, we relate the observed profitability of the carry trade and momentum strategies to the empirical failure of UIP. The payo!s to the strategies can each be written as:
The two strategies di!er only in the definition of u t .
Consider, first, the case in which agents are risk neutral about nominal payo!s. In this case the conditional expected return to taking a long position in foreign currency should be zero, i.e.
This is the UIP condition. When this condition holds neither strategy generates positive
= 0, and, therefore, E(z L t+1 ) = 0. CIP and UIP, together, imply that the forward exchange rate is an unbiased forecaster of the future spot exchange rate, i.e. F t = E t (S t+1 ). It has been known since Bilson (1981) and Fama (1984) that forward-rate unbiasedness fails empirically. So, we should not be surprised that both currency strategies yield non-zero average profits. However, the two strategies di!er subtly in how they exploit the fact that the forward is not an unbiased predictor of the future spot.
To see why the carry trade has positive expected payo!s recall the classic result of Meese & Rogo! (1983) that the spot exchange rate is well approximated by a martingale:
Equations (7) and (3) imply that the expected value of the payo! to the carry trade is:
So, the carry trade makes positive average profits as long as there is a di!erence between the forward and spot rates, or, equivalently, an interest rate di!erential between the domestic currency and the foreign currency.
To gain further insight into the average profitability of the carry trade, note that in our sample:
So, the probability that the carry trade is profitable is 0.571. This profitability reflects the ability of the sign of the forward discount to predict the sign of the payo! to a long position in foreign currency.
The momentum strategy exploits the fact that, at least in sample, there is information in the sign of z
In the next section we turn to the question of whether risk-adjusting the UIP condition can explain the payo!s of the two currency strategies.
Risk and currency strategies
In this section we argue that the average payo! to our two currency strategies cannot be justified as compensation for exposure to conventional risk factors. We begin by outlining the theory that underlies our estimation strategy. We then describe how we measure the risk exposures of the two currency strategies. Finally, we discuss our empirical findings.
Theory
When agents are risk averse the payo!s to the currency strategies must satisfy:
Here, M t+1 denotes the SDF that prices payo!s denominated in dollars, while E t is the mathematical expectations operator given information available at time t.
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The unconditional version of equation (8) is:
This equation can be written as:
( 1 0 ) In practice, the average unconditional payo!s to the strategies that we consider are positive.
The most straightforward explanation of this finding is that cov(z, M ) < 0.
7 Most of our analysis is conducted with nominal monthly payo!s. Two of our SDF models are based on real risk factors that are measured at the quarterly frequency. When we work with these models, we follow Burnside et al. (2011) in using quarterly compounded real excess returns to our two strategies.
One can always rationalize the observed payo!s to these strategies by using a statistical model to compute the risk premium as a residual. Consider, for example, the carry trade, in which case we can write equation (8) as:
( 1 1 ) Here, p t is the risk premium which is given by:
Given a statistical model for E t (S t+1 ! S t ), we can use equation (11) to back out a time series for p t and call that residual a "risk premium":
By construction, this risk premium can rationalize the payo!s to the carry trade. If the spot exchange rate is a martingale, this procedure amounts to labeling the forward premium the risk premium. While such an exercise can provide insights, we view the key challenge as finding observable risk factors that are correlated with the payo!s of the two strategies.
Our analysis uses equation (9) as our point of departure. We consider linear SDFs that take the form:
Here " is a scalar, f t is a k # 1 vector of risk factors, µ = E(f t ), and b is a k # 1 vector of parameters. We set " = 1, because " is not identified by equation (9). Given this assumption and the model for M given in equation (12), equation (9) can be rewritten as:
where ! f is the covariance matrix of f t . The betas in equation (13) are population coe"cients in a regression of z t on f t and measure the exposure of the payo! to aggregate risk. The k # 1 vector $ measures the risk premia associated with the risk factors.
Empirical strategy
We assess risk-based explanations of the returns to our currency strategies in two ways.
First, we ask whether there are risk factors for which the payo!s to the strategies have statistically significant betas. These betas are estimated by running time-series regressions of each portfolio's excess return on a vector of candidate risk factors:
( 1 4 ) Here T is the sample size, and n is the number of portfolios being studied. This step in our analysis is similar in its approach, and in its conclusions, to Villanueva (2007) .
Second, we determine whether GMM estimates of a candidate SDF can explain the returns to the carry trade by testing whether equation (9), or, equivalently, equation (13),
holds for the estimated model. We estimate the parameters of the SDF, b and µ, using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM, Hansen 1982) , and the moment restrictions (9) and E(f ) = µ. Equation (9) can be rewritten as:
where z is an n # 1 vector of excess returns. The GMM estimators of µ and b areμ =f and
where d T is the sample covariance matrix of z with f , and W T is a weighting matrix. n ! k degrees of freedom.
8 Burnside (2007) provides details of the GMM procedure.
In the first GMM step the weighting matrix is W T = I n , and the estimate of $ and the pricing errors are the same as the ones obtained by running a cross-sectional regression of average portfolio excess returns on the estimated betas:
is the OLS estimate of # i , and & i is the pricing error. In subsequent GMM steps the weighting matrix is chosen optimally. Our results are similar at all stages of GMM, so, due to space limitations, we only present results for iterated GMM.
Empirical results with conventional risk factors
In this section we use the empirical methods outlined in the previous section to determine whether there is a candidate SDF that can price the returns to the carry trade and momentum. We consider several models using monthly data: the CAPM (Sharpe 1964 , Lintner 1965 ), the Fama & French (1993) three factor model, the quadratic CAPM (Harvey & Siddique, 2000) , and a model that uses the CAPM factor, realized stock market volatility, and their interaction, as factors. The latter two models are ones in which the market betas of the assets being studied can be thought of as being time varying. We also consider two models using quarterly data. The first model (the C-CAPM) uses the growth rate of real consumption of nondurables and services as a single factor. This model is a linear approximation to a representative agent model in which households have standard preferences over a single consumption good. The second model (the extended C-CAPM) uses three factors: the growth rate of real consumption of nondurables and services, the growth rate of the service flow from the real stock of durables, and the market return. This model is a linear approximation to a representative agent model in which households have recursive preferences over the two types of consumption good (see Yogo, 2006) . Table 2 summarizes the estimates we obtain by running the time-series regressions described by equation (14) for monthly and quarterly models. In every case, but one, we find that the estimated betas are insignificantly di!erent from zero. The one exception is that the beta for the carry trade associated with the market return in the Fama-French three factor model is statistically significant. However, this coe"cient is economically small (0.045).
Given our estimates of the Fama-French model, the implied annual expected return of the carry trade portfolio should only be 0.3 percent. The actual return is 4.6 percent. Table 3 presents estimates of the monthly models based on iterated GMM estimation. Table 4 presents analogous results for the quarterly models. The models are estimated using the equally-weighted carry trade and momentum portfolios, as well as Fama and French's 25 portfolios sorted on the basis of book to market value and size. First, note that in every case the pricing errors of the currency strategies are large and statistically significant. So, even though the models have some explanatory power for stocks, none of the models explains currency strategies payo!s. Second, all of the models are rejected, at the 5 percent level, by the pricing error test.
The only model with a reasonably good fit (positive R 2 ) is the Fama-French model. But it, like the other models, does a very poor job of explaining the returns to the currency portfolios. Figure 2 plotsẑ, the predictions of the Fama-French model for E (z t ), against z, the sample average of z t . The circles pertain to the Fama-French portfolios, the star pertains to the carry trade portfolio, and the square pertains to the momentum portfolio.
Not surprisingly, the model does a reasonably good job of pricing the excess returns to the Fama-French 25 portfolios. However, the model greatly understates the average payo!s to the currency strategies. The annualized average payo! to the carry trade and momentum strategies are 4.6 and 4.5 percent, respectively. The Fama-French model predicts that these average returns should equal 0.2 and !0.2 percent. The solid lines through the star and square are two-standard-error bands for the di!erence between the data and model average payo!, i.e. the pricing error. Clearly, we can reject the hypothesis that the model accounts for the average payo!s to the currency strategies.
Overall, our results are consistent with those in Villanueva (2007) , Burnside et al. (2011), and Burnside (2011) , who show that a wider set of conventional risk factors cannot explain the returns to the carry trade. Our results show that conventional risk factors also cannot explain the returns to the currency momentum portfolio.
Factors derived from currency returns
We now turn to less traditional risk-factor models in which the factors are derived from the returns to currency strategies. This approach, introduced to the currency literature by Lustig et al. (2009) , is similar to the one popularized by Fama & French (1993) who construct risk factors based on the returns to particular stock strategies. Each portfolio is equally weighted and represents the excess return to lending at the risk-free rate the currencies included in the portfolio while borrowing USD at the risk free rate. Table 5 shows that the average return to the portfolios S1-S5 is monotonically increasing.
This property is not surprising given Meese & Rogo!'s (1983) result that exchange rates are close to a martingale. If the spot exchange rate for each currency was exactly a martingale, then the conditional mean of each portfolio's return would equal the average forward discount of the constituent currencies. So, for a large enough sample, the sorting procedure would generate portfolios with monotonically increasing average returns.
Consistent with the literature, we attempt to explain the cross-section of returns to these portfolios of currencies, but we add the equally-weighted momentum portfolio to the set of test assets. 9 By focusing on currency portfolios and excluding stock returns from our analysis, we allow for the possibility that markets are segmented, so that currency traders and stock market investors have di!erent SDFs. That said, factors that explain portfolios S1-S5 should also explain the currency momentum portfolio.
Currency-based risk factors
Like Lustig et al. (2009) , we construct two risk factors directly from the sorted portfolios.
The first risk factor, which they call the dollar risk factor and denote by DOL, is simply the average excess return of the five sorted portfolios. The second risk factor, which they denote by HML FX , is the return di!erential between the S5 portfolio (the largest forward discount) and the S1 portfolio (the smallest forward discount). So, HML FX is the payo! to a carry trade strategy in which we go long in the highest forward-discount currencies and go short in the smallest forward-discount currencies.
Following Menkho! et. al. (2011a) , we construct a measure of global currency volatility, which we denote by VOL. It is measured monthly, and is the average sample standard deviation of the daily log changes in the values of the currencies in our sample against the USD. Table 5 summarizes the results of estimating time-series regressions of the monthly excess returns to S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, the carry trade portfolio and the momentum portfolio on two pairs of risk factors: DOL and HML FX , and DOL and VOL.
Betas of currency-based factors
The DOL and HML FX factors are highly correlated with the S1-S5 portfolio returns. The betas on the DOL factor are all close to one in value, and statistically significant. The betas of the HML FX factor rise monotonically from !0.48 for S1 to 0.52 for S5. The betas for S2, S3 and S4 are close to zero. While the R 2 for the five regressions are large, this result is not particularly surprising. Sorting portfolios on the basis of the forward discount produces a monotonic ordering of the expected returns. So, the DOL and HML FX factors create, by construction, a pattern in the betas similar to that in Table 5 . 10 DOL and HML FX also have positive and significant betas for the equally-weighted carry trade portfolio, but the R 2 is 10 See Burnside (2011) for a detailed discussion.
much lower in this case. Finally, neither factor has a significant beta for the momentum portfolio.
Replacing HML FX with VOL as a factor has very little impact on the betas with respect to DOL. The betas with respect to VOL decrease monotonically as we go from S1 to S5
and are statistically significant for the extreme portfolios, being positive for S1 and negative for S5. These findings indicate that when global currency volatility increases, the returns to holding low-interest rate currencies increase and the returns to holding high-interest rate currencies decrease. That is, low interest rate currencies provide a hedge against increases in volatility. The beta with respect to VOL is also negative and statistically significant for the carry trade portfolio. The beta with respect to VOL is positive but insignificant for the currency momentum portfolio. Table 6 presents iterated GMM estimates of the SDF for the two currency-based factor models, using portfolios S1-S5 and the momentum portfolio as test assets. Figure 3 shows the mean returns in the sample plotted against the model-predicted expected returns.
Cross-sectional analysis of currency-based risk factors
In both cases, the b parameter associated with the DOL factor is statistically insignificant.
The risk premium, $ DOL , is positive and significant in one case. But in neither case does exposure to DOL explain much of the variation in expected return across portfolios.
The b and $ parameters associated with the HML FX factor are positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The b and $ parameters associated with the VOL factor are negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Neither the DOL-HML FX model nor the DOL-VOL model do a good job of fitting the overall cross section of average payo!s to the currency strategies. The R 2 is lower than 0.04 for both models. The DOL-HML FX model is rejected on the basis of the pricing-error test.
The DOL-VOL model is not rejected. But this apparent success is mostly due to the model's parameters being estimated with less precision than those of the HML FX -based model.
The primary failing of both models is the large pricing error associated with momentum (approximately 5 percent). To understand this failing recall that the average payo! to the momentum strategy is 4.5 percent. The DOL-HML FX cannot explain this large payo! because momentum's beta is close to zero with respect to DOL and a negative with respect to HML FX . The DOL-VOL model does no better because it has a paradoxically positive (but poorly estimated) beta with respect to VOL, i.e. momentum is a good hedge against volatility. Menkho! et al. (2011a) find a similar paradox using a set of sorted momentum portfolios.
Concluding discussion
The results in this section suggest that observable risk factors explain very little of the average returns to the carry trade and momentum portfolios, resulting in economically large pricing errors. In every case the models can also be rejected based on statistical tests of the pricing errors. Models built from currency specific factors do have some success in explaining the returns to the carry trade. But, they do not explain the returns to the momentum portfolio.
4 Rare disasters and peso problems by the presence of rare disasters or peso problems. 11 By rare disasters we mean very low probability events that sharply decrease the payo! and/or sharply increase the value of the SDF. These events may occur in sample. But, due to their low probability, they may be under-represented relative to their true frequency in population. By a peso problem we mean an extreme form of this problem, where rare disasters do not occur in sample.
11 In this review we focus on recent work that uses options data to study the importance of rare disasters and peso problems. See Evans (2011) for an excellent overview of the earlier literature that uses survey data and regime-switching models to study how peso problems a!ect conditional inference about the behavior of exchange rates.
Rare disasters We study the e!ects of rare disasters on inference using a simple model. Let ( % " denote the state of the world, let z(() denote the payo! to a currency strategy in state (, and M (() denote the value of the SDF in state (. We partition ", the set of possible states, into two sets. The first set, " N , consists of those values of ( corresponding to non-rare-disaster (normal) events. The second set, " D , consists of those values of ( corresponding to a rare-disaster event. For simplicity, we assume that " D contains a single event, ( D . We use the notation
, and assume that z " < 0. To simplify, we assume that the conditional and unconditional probability of the rare disaster is p.
Payo!s to a currency strategy must satisfy:
where E N (·) denotes the expectation over normal states. Since the scale of M is not identified for zero net investment strategies, we choose the normalization E N (M ) = 1.
How can rare disasters explain the profitability of a currency strategy? Assume, for simplicity, that an econometrician can observe M and z and that the sample average of Mz across normal events in the sample equals E N (Mz). Suppose that in sample rare disasters occur with frequencyp < p. Since z " < 0, the overall sample average of Mz is positive, even though the true unconditional value is zero:
How likely are we to observe an unusually small number of rare disasters in sample?
Consider the value of p suggested by Nakamura et al. (2010) . These authors define a rare disaster as a large drop in consumption. Using data spanning 24 countries and more than 100 years, they estimate the annual probability of a disaster to be 0.017. The corresponding monthly value of p is 0.0014.
Since most work on currency strategies focuses on the post Bretton-Woods era, we think of a typical sample size as roughly (2011 ! 1973) # 12 = 456 months. For p = 0.0014, the expected number of events in a sample of this size is less than one. Indeed, the probability of observing zero rare disasters in a sample of 456 months is roughly 53 percent.
Can we interpret particular in-sample events as realizations of the rare disaster event that accounts for the observed profitability of the carry trade and momentum strategies?
For example, was the 2008 financial crisis an example of such a rare disaster? The answer is no. To see why, note that equation (18) implies that the ratio of risk-adjusted mean payo!s in the normal states must be equal to the ratio of the payo!s in the disaster state:
( 1 9 ) Here, z " 1 and z " 2 denote the payo!s to the carry trade and momentum strategy in the disaster state. We define the disaster period to be August-November 2008 because, during this period, the carry trade su!ered a cumulative net loss of about 10 percent, its worst loss over a four month period in our sample. In contrast, the momentum strategy had a cumulative gain of about 24 percent in this period, its largest over a four month period in our sample. So the ratio on the right hand side of equation (19) is negative. Since the average risk-adjusted profits of both strategies are positive outside of the crisis period, the left hand side of equation (19) is positive. So, the financial crisis is not a plausible example of a rare-disaster event that accounts for the profitability of the carry trade and momentum strategies. Neither are other periods in our sample (early 1991, and late 1992) when carry trades took heavy losses.
In these periods the momentum strategy was also highly profitable.
There are two ways to avoid the conclusion that the recent financial crisis is not the type of rare disaster that accounts for the profitability of the carry trade and momentum strategies. The first is to assume that, because of market segmentation, M " is di!erent for the two currency trading strategies. This hypothesis seems very implausible. The second is to assume that " D contains more than one event, and not all strategies earn negative returns in all of these events. So the financial crisis could be viewed as a rare disaster in which the carry trade has a negative payo! but momentum does not. We cannot rule out this explanation on logical grounds. But it leaves unexplained the in-sample profitability of the momentum strategy.
Peso problems Recall that a peso problem corresponds to the case where there are no raredisasters in sample, sop = 0. Absent additional assumptions, the peso-problem explanation of the profitability of our two strategies has no testable implications, since z " is not observed.
To generate testable implications we assume, as above, that there is a single peso event. We can then use data on currency options to develop a test of the peso-problem hypothesis.
Investors can use options to construct hedged versions of currency strategies that are exposed to disaster risk. These hedged strategies put an upper bound on an investor's possible losses. Suppose a currency strategy involves going long (short) on foreign currency.
Then this strategy is exposed to large losses if there is a large depreciation (appreciation) of the foreign currency. By buying a put (call) option on foreign currency the investor can bound these losses. The payo! to a hedged strategy, z H t+1 , is given by
if the option is in the money, z t+1 ! c t (1 + i t ) if the option is out of the money.
The variables c t and i t denote the cost of the put or call option and i t denotes the nominal interest rate. The variable h t+1 is the lower bound on the investor's net payo!.
Since the hedged strategy is also a zero net-investment strategy, its payo!, z H , must satisfy:
Using equation (20) to solve for pM " and replacing this term in equation (18), we obtain:
Motivated by our previous results we assume that cov (21) simplifies to:
Using equations (18) and (20) we can derive two expressions for ) & pM " /(1 ! p) that are numerically identical given our method of estimating z " :
Here, we estimate ) because the parameters p and M " are not separately identified by the pricing equations.
We estimate z " and ) for the carry trade using currency option data from J.P. Morgan for ten major currencies over the period [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . As in Burnside et al. (2011) , we assume that in the disaster state all of the individual currency carry trades lose money. Consequently, we assume that the investor hedges the equally-weighted carry trade strategy by buying at-the-money options. This assumption means that the payo! of the carry trade portfolio in the peso state is the average of the minimum payo!s of the individual carry trades in that state.
The momentum strategy for an individual currency sometimes takes the opposite position of the carry trade strategy. In these instances, if we assume carry is exposed to disaster risk, momentum is naturally hedged against it. This property presents a di"culty for our empirical strategy because it means that the unhedged momentum payo! for an individual currency in the disaster state is occasionally !z " , rather than z " .
To bring momentum into our analysis, we consider a 50-50 portfolio that equally combines the carry trade and momentum portfolios. Suppose each of these portfolios is formed with n currencies. When the two underlying strategies agree on the sign of an individual currency trade, the net position in the portfolio for that currency is ±1/n. In this case, the position is naturally exposed to disaster risk, and this risk can be hedged using options. When the two underlying strategies disagree on the sign of an individual currency trade, the net position for that currency is zero.
Using data on the payo!s to the hedged and unhedged carry trade and 50-50 carrymomentum strategies, and data on the minimum payo!s to the hedged strategies, we estimate the moments that appear on the right hand sides of equations (22) and (23). Doing so provides us with estimates of z " 1 (the payo! to the equally-weighted carry trade in the disaster state) and z " 2 (the payo! to the 50-50 strategy in the disaster state), and two estimates of ). Using a Wald test, we can test whether the two estimates of ) are equal, which they should be, in absence of market segmentation.
12 Alternatively, we can use the pricing equations of the hedged and unhedged versions of the two strategies to estimate the three parameters, z " 1 and z " 2 and ) using GMM. This system is overidentified, and, therefore, provides us with a simple test of the peso problem hypothesis.
When we use the first procedure, our estimates are z 2 , we can be quite confident that the disaster event is not characterized by large losses to either the carry trade or the 50-50 carry-momentum portfolio.
When we use the second procedure, our estimates of z we assume that the true probability of a rare event is p = 0.0014, then M " " = 63.
Our analysis assumes that the SDF takes on a single value in the rare disaster or peso state. Under alternative assumptions, we can still generate testable implications of the peso problem hypothesis. For example, Burnside et al. (2011) show how to estimate a lower bound for E D (z 1 ) allowing for negative covariance between payo!s to the carry trade and the SDF in the peso state.
Overall, we find little evidence against the peso event hypothesis. According to our point estimates, the peso event is not characterized by large losses to the currency strategies.
Instead, it is characterized by moderate losses and large values of the SDF.
Price pressure
In this section we discuss an alternative explanation for the profitability of our currency strategies raised in Burnside et al. (2006) . This explanation relies on the existence of price pressure in the foreign exchange market. By price pressure we mean that the price at which investors can buy or sell an asset depends on the quantity they wish to transact. There is a strand of research in finance that stresses the possibility that demand curves for assets are downward sloping. Shleifer (1986) and Mitchell & Pulvino (2004) present evidence in support of this view for stocks.
Anecdotal evidence gathered from currency traders suggests that a similar phenomenon occurs in foreign exchange markets: prices move against individual traders when they place large orders. Here we present a simple model that illustrates the implications of price pressure for the profitability of currency-trading strategies.
The case of a single trader Consider an asset that has a value v +*, where * is a random variable with mean zero. Suppose that there is a single risk-neutral trader who decides to buy x units of the asset. To capture the basic e!ects of price pressure we suppose that the price of the asset that the trader purchases depends on order size in the following way. The price in the beginning of the day is:
As long as a < v, it is optimal for the trader to buy a positive quantity of the asset. Trading takes place during the course of a day. At instant t during the day the change in the price depends on the quantity of orders, m t , submitted at that point in time:
We assume that b is positive, so that the price is an increasing function of the quantity purchased, i.e., there is price pressure.
Suppose the trader wants to buy x units of currency during the day. Consider the following two strategies. Strategy A is to submit an order for x, say, at the end of the day.
The price associated with the order is a + bx, so that the total cost of the order is: x (a + bx).
Strategy B is to break up the order and submit orders of size m = x/T throughout the day. Here, T is the number of trading minutes in the day. The price of the asset at time t is given by:
The total cost of the order is:
It is clear that, from the perspective of the trader, strategy B dominates strategy A. So, we assume that the trader uses strategy B and breaks up the orders. It is useful to re-write the total cost of the order as:
The trader's profit, +, is given by:
The trader chooses x to maximize the expected value of +:
The first-order condition for this problem implies that the optimal value of x, x ! , is given by:
The price paid for the last unit of the asset purchased is:
We wish to stress two key features of this example. First, the expected profit from the last unit of the asset purchased by the trader is equal to zero. Second, the total expected profits earned by the trader are positive:
Consider an econometrician who observes the average trade during the day. He would correctly infer that the strategy is profitable. Suppose that he ignores the existence of price pressure and assumes that marginal and average profits coincide. Then he would incorrectly conclude that the trader is leaving money on the table by not expanding the size of the trade.
The case of n traders Suppose that there is a fixed number, n, of traders. Within the day price pressure is governed by equations (24) and (25) where m t denotes total orders arriving at time t. Consider a Nash equilibrium in which each trader chooses to buy x units of the asset taking as given that the remaining n ! 1 traders buyx units each. The order in which trades occur is randomly determined after traders choose x. Trader j trades from time T (j ! 1)/n to time T j/n, where the index j takes values from one to n. Each trader breaks up his orders uniformly within his trading period. Since a representative trader has a probability 1/n of being the jth trader, his expected profit is:
The optimal value of x satisfies the first-order condition:
In a symmetric equilibrium x =x, so:
The average expected profit across traders is positive and equal to:
The expected profit of a trader who has a position j in the trading queue is:
So, when n is large, roughly half of the traders make profits and the other half make losses.
The profits of the winners are larger than the losses of the losers, which is why average profits across traders are positive.
As in the single trader case, an econometrician who observes the average trade during the day would conclude that the strategy is profitable. He might wonder why traders don't increase their positions until this profitability vanishes. But, while the average trade generates profits, the marginal trade makes losses. So, there is no reason for traders to expand their positions. No money is being left on the table.
Conclusion
We discuss two conventional explanations for the apparent profitability of the carry trade and momentum strategies. The first is that investors are compensated for the risk they bear.
While this hypothesis is very appealing, we find little evidence to support it. The second conventional explanation is that the profitability of the two currency strategies results from a rare disaster or peso problem. We argue that the recent financial crisis is not a rare disaster from the standpoint of a currency speculator who uses both the carry trade and momentum strategies. We also argue that the peso event is not characterized by large losses to currency speculators. Instead, it features moderate losses and high values of the stochastic discount factor.
Finally, we discuss the potential role of price pressure in explaining the profitability of the two currency strategies. While this approach shows some promise, two important questions remain to be answered. e The U.S. stock market return is the value-weighted excess return on all U.S. stocks. Table 2 for the definitions of risk factors.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses, except as noted. An asterisk ( * ) indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level.
a b is the parameter vector in the SDF, m = 1 -(f -µ)"b.
b ! is the vector of risk premia associated with the factors.
c R 2 is a measure of fit between the sample average and model-predicted mean returns.
d J is the test statistic for the overidentifying restrictions are also reported. P-values are reported in parentheses.
e Annualized %. The portfolios are five portfolios of long positions in foreign currency sorted in increasing order by the forward discount (S1-S5), the carry trade portfolio and the momentum portfolio.
c The DOL factor is the average excess return to portfolios S1-S5.
The HML FX factor is the excess return to being long portfolio S5 and short portfolio S1.
e The VOL factor is a measure of realized global currency volatility. order by the forward discount (S1-S5), and the momentum portfolio. See Table 5 b ! is the vector of risk premia associated with the factors.
e Annualized % f Momentum
